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FOREWORD 
Judge Louis H. Pollak* 
I. 
In the October Term 1994 - in other words, October 1994 
through June 1995 - the Supreme Court invalidated four federal 
statutes. Statistically speaking, this was a bumper crop of judicial 
harvesting, given that, in the 191 years from Marbury v. Madisonl 
through June 1994, only 129 federal statutes were gathered in by the 
grim reaper of judicial review,2 substantially less than one legisla-
tive demise a year. But numbers tell very little because some fed-
eral statutes are more equal than others. None of the four federal 
statutes laid to rest in the October Term 1994 deserves mention in 
the same breath with such venerable judicially ambushed statutes of 
yesteryear as the Missouri Compromise of 1820,3 the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875,4 the income tax provisions of the Tariff Act of August 
15, 1894,5 and the Child Labor Act of September 1, 1916.6 The four 
federal statutes that lost their way in the October Term 1994 were: 
(1) section 5(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 
1935,7 barring the inclusion on beer labels of information respecting 
the alcohol content of the beer - a restriction found incompatible 
with the First Amendment;8 (2) provisions of the Ethics Reform 
Act of 1989,9 prohibiting federal employees from receiving compen-
sation for lectures or writings, even when entirely non-job-related 
* Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania-Ed. 
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 {1803). 
2. See Linda Greenhouse, Farewell to the Old Order in the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 
1995, at E4. 
3. Act of Mar. 6,1820, ch. 22,3 Stat. 545 (repealed 1854). The Missouri Compromise was 
held unconstitutional in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
4. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 336-37 (Sections 3 and 4 were repealed in 1948; 
§ 5 presently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1984 {1994).). The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was held 
unconstitutional in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 {1883). 
5. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (superseded by scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.). The Tariff Act of August 15, 1894 was held unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers 
Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
6. Act of Sept 1, 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat 675. The Child Labor Act of September 1, 1916 
was held unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
7. 27 u.s.c. §§ 201-19 (1988). 
8. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995) (Thomas, J.; Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
9. 18 u.s.c. § 208 (1990). 
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- a restriction also found not in accord with the First Amend-
ment;10 (3) section 476 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act of 1991,11 which undertook to reinstate on 
federal judicial dockets certain categories of civil suits arising under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that had been 
held time-barred pursuant to a 1991 Supreme Court decision - a 
congressional directive to courts to disregard a Supreme Court rul-
ing that was held to contravene the separation of powers;12 and (4) 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,13 which made. it a federal 
crime to possess a firearm on the premises or within a 1000 foot 
radius of a schooP4 - a prohibition held to be beyond the power 
conferred on Congress by Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Con-
stitution to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States."lS 
While the Gun-Free School Zones Act does not seem to have 
been of greater intrinsic importance than its three fellow legislative 
10. See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (Ste-
vens, J.; O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Rehnquist, C.J., joined by 
Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
11. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.). 
12. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. a. 1447 (1995) (Scalia, J.; Breyer, J., con-
curring; Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
13. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994). 
14. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994) provided, 
in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the 
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone. 
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (1994) provided: 
The term "school zone" means -
(A) in, or on the ground of, a public, parochial or private school; or 
(B) within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private 
school. 
The statute provided for various situations in which the prohibition on the possession of 
firearms was not applicable - for example, possession "by a law enforcement officer," 18 
U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(vi) (1994), and possession "on private property not part of school 
grounds," 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(i) (1994). 
Section 922(q) was amended in 1994 to add numerous findings relating to: the pervasive-
ness of crime involving guns and drugs; the tendency of such crime to be exacerbated by the 
interstate movement of guns, drugs, and criminals; the fear of crime that retards the inter-
state movement of peaceful citizens and the readiness of parents to send their children to 
school in high-crime areas; the correlation between crime in school and "a decline in the 
quality of education"; the "adverse impact on interstate commerce and .•. foreign com-
merce" of declining educational quality; and the authority of Congress under the Commerce 
Clause and other constitutional provisions "to enact measures to ensure the integrity and 
safety of the Nation's schools." Gun-Free School Zones Act, ch. 44, sec. 320904, § 922(q)(1)· 
(3), 108 Stat. 1796,2125-26 (1994). This 1994 amendment to§ 922(q) was adopted two years 
after the gun possession by Alfonso Lopez, Jr., which gave rise to the criminal prosecution 
that resulted, in 1995, in the invalidation of§ 922(q) in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 
(1995). 
15. 115 s. a. at 1626. 
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casualties,16 its demise as announced in United States v. Lopez17 by 
a Court divided five to four,18 has been thought to merit the atten-
tion of a symposium issue of the Michigan Law Review, while the 
other demises have not. Why the difference? 
II. 
The difference lies in the fact that Lopez was the first time since 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 19 decided fifty-nine years before- in the 
spring of 1936, the fourth year of Franklin Roosevelt's first term -
that the Court held that Congress had passed a law that exceeded 
its authority under the Commerce Clause. In Carter - by a vote of 
six to three - the Court held, inter alia, that the provisions of the 
Bituminous Coal Act of 1935 "in respect of minimum wages, wage 
agreements [and] collective bargaining"20 in the Depression-
stricken bituminous coal industry were unconstitutional. The Court 
reasoned that mining constituted "production" which is an "antece-
dent" of, not a part of, "commerce."21 "Mining," said the Carter 
Court, 
brings the subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce dis-
poses of it .... Everything which moves in interstate commerce has 
had a local origin. Without local production somewhere, interstate 
commerce, as now carried on, would practically disappear. Neverthe-
less, the local character of mining, of manufacturing and of crop grow-
ing is a fact, and remains a fact, whatever may be done with the 
products.22 
Carter was the culmination of a series of decisions invalidating ma-
jor New Deal initiatives on the ground that the transactions Con-
gress sought to regulate were not part of "commerce" or that the 
16. The invalidation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act would not seem to create a signif-
icant gap in law enforcement. In his concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Kennedy (writing 
for himself and Justice O'Connor) notes that 
[i]f a State or municipality determines that harsh criminal sanctions are necessary and 
wise to deter students from carrying guns on school premises, the reserved powers of the 
States are sufficient to enact those measures. Indeed, over 40 States already have crimi-
nal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds. 
115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
17. 115 s. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
18. The five Justices in the majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist - author of the 
Court's opinion - and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. The four Justices 
in the minority were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer - author of the princi-
pal dissent. For a breakdown of the other opinions filed, see infra note 40. 
19. 298 u.s. 238 (1936). 
20. 298 U.S. at 304 (holding unconstitutional15 U.S.C. §§ 801-27 (1935) (repealed 1937)). 
21. See 298 U.S. at 304. 
22. 298 U.S. at 304. 
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transactions' effect on commerce was "indirect" rather than 
"direct. "23 
Less than a year after Carter- on Apri112, 1937, three months 
after the commencement of Roosevelt's second term - the Court, 
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,24 shifted gears. With 
hardly a backward glance at Carter, the Court - by a margin of 
five to four- sustained the directive of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, issued pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act 
of 1935, that Jones & Laughlin, a major steel company, desist from 
discriminating against employees on the basis of union membership 
and in other respects interfering with attempts to organize the com-
pany's employees.25 Chief Justice Hughes spoke for the Court: 
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their 
relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, 
how can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations consti-
tute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when it is 
necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing con-
sequences of industrial war? We have often said that interstate com-
merce itself is a practical conception. It is equally true that 
23. See Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) 
(spending power). 
24. 301 u.s. 1 (1937). 
25. Two members of the Carter majority - Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts -
voted with the majority in Jones & Laughlin. Indeed, Chief Justice Hughes wrote the Court's 
opinion in Jones & Laughlin. 1\vo other National Labor Relations Board cases - NLRB v. 
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937), and Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) 
- were decided on the same day; the Labor Board's orders were sustained on the authority 
of Jones & Laughlin. Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court in Fruehauf Trailer, and 
Justice Roberts wrote for the Court in Associated Press. The Court's apparent change in 
direction in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, between 1936 and 1937, was mirrored by the 
Court's change in direction, between 1936 and 1937, in Due Process Clause jurisprudence. 
Relying on Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating a D.C. minimum-
wage-for-women statute on due process grounds), the Court in 1936, in Morehead v. New 
York ex reL npaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), by a vote of five to four, invalidated New York's 
minimum-wage-for-women statute. A year later, in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937), decided two weeks before Jones & Laughlin, the Court, by a vote of five to four, 
sustained a Washington statute decreeing a minimum wage for women. Chief Justice 
Hughes, who had written the principal dissent in Tipaldo, wrote for the Court in West Coast 
Hotel. Justice Roberts was in the majority in both cases. Justice Roberts's apparent shift of 
position at a time when the Court was coming under increasing public criticism for decisions 
blocking liberal federal and state legislation triggered some hostile commentary - including 
suggestions that Justice Roberts may have tailored his views to help ward off Franklin 
Roosevelt's (ill-fated) Court-packing plan. In a lecture delivered shortly after Justice Rob-
erts's death, Justice Frankfurter strongly defended Justice Roberts. See Felix Frankfurter, 
Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 311 (1955). Recently an article appeared which, inter 
alia, intimated that a memorandum by Justice Roberts on which Justice Frankfurter pur-
ported to rely in his defense of Justice Roberts never may have existed. See Michael Ariens, 
A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix The Cat, 107 HARV. L. REv. 620,644-49 (1994). That claim was 
quickly demolished. See Richard D. Friedman, A Reaffirmation: The Authenticity of The 
Roberts Memorandum, or Felix The Non-Forger, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1985 (1994). 
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interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment 
that does not ignore actual experience. 
Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of 
the right of employees to self-organization and to have representa-
tives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is 
often an essential condition of industrial peace. Refusal to confer and 
negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife. This is 
such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a 
proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of 
instances .... 
. . . The steel industry is one of the great basic industries of the 
United States, with ramifying activities affecting interstate commerce 
at every point. The Government aptly refers to the steel strike of 
1919-1920 with its far-reaching consequences. The fact that there ap-
pears to have been no major disturbance in that industry in the more 
recent period did not dispose of the possibilities of future and like 
dangers to interstate commerce which Congress was entitled to fore-
see and to exercise its protective power to forestall. It is not neces-
sary again to detail the facts as to respondent's enterprise. Instead of 
being beyond the pale, we think that it presents in a most striking way 
the close and intimate relation which a manufacturing industry may 
have to interstate commerce and we have no doubt that Congress had 
constitutional authority to safeguard the right of respondent's em-
ployees to self-organization and freedom in the choice of representa-
tives for collective bargaining.26 
Writing for the Court in Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist charac-
terizes Chief Justice Hughes's opinion in Jones & Laughlin as a 
"watershed" that "departed from the distinction between 'direct' 
and 'indirect' effects on interstate commerce" and held that "intra-
state activities that 'have such a close and substantial relation to 
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to 
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions' are within 
Congress' power to regulate."27 
The Court's post-Jones & Laughlin decisions have confirmed 
what was implicit in Jones & Laughlin itself - that federal legisla-
tion regulating activities having a rationally demonstrable substan-
tial impact on interstate commerce would be sustained.28 The 
decisions also have established that Congress does not have to show 
that each transaction it regulates has a substantial impact on com-
merce: "[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a substantial 
26. Fruehauf Trailer, 301 U.S. 41-43 (footnote omitted). 
27. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1628 (1995) (quoting Jones & Laughlin, 301 
U.S. at 36-38). 
28. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 
197 n.27 (1968); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); see also Wickard v. Filbum, 
317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
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relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual in-
stances arising under that statute is of no consequence. "29 
The paradigm illustration of this aggregation principle is Wick-
ard v. Filburn, 30 in which the Court sustained a penalty imposed by 
the Secretary of Agriculture on Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio dairy 
farmer, who harvested more wheat than permitted by his wheat al-
lotment under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. This stat-
ute enabled the Department of Agriculture to control the volume 
of American wheat production and thereby avoid calamitous swings 
in the price of a crop forming a major part of the world food supply. 
On Filbum's small farm, the principal market products were milk, 
eggs, and poultry. In addition, he grew winter wheat - "home-
grown" wheat - that was used as feed, retained as seed for the 
next season, or ground into flour for home consumption. Filbum's 
permitted wheat acreage for 1941 was 11.1 acres; he also planted 
and harvested 11.9 excess acres that yielded 239 excess bushels -
with a resultant penalty of forty cents per bushel, totaling $117.11. 
As Justice Jackson explained for a unanimous Court, wheat har-
vested for home consumption 
overhangs the market and, if induced by rising prices, tends to flow 
into the market and check price increases. But if we assume that it is 
never marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which 
would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. 
Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in com-
merce .... This record leaves us in no doubt that Congress may prop-
erly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown, 
if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would have a substantial 
effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade 
therein at increased prices.31 
Moreover, the fact "[t]hat [Filburn's] own contribution to the de-
mand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him 
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribu-
tion, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is 
far from trivial. "32 
In similar fashion, the Court in Perez v. United States33 upheld a 
provision of the Consumer Credit Protection Act,34 which makes it 
a crime to engage in "[e]xtortionate credit transactions"- in other 
29. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 197 n.27. 
30. 317 u.s. 111 (1942). 
31. 317 U.S. at 128-29. 
32. 317 U.S. at 127-28. 
33. 402 u.s 146 (1971). 
34. 18 u.s.c. §§ 891-96 (1968). 
December 1995] Foreword 539 
words, transactions involving "the use, or an express or implicit 
threat of use, of violence or other criminal means" to effectuate 
repayment. Alcides Perez was a "loan shark" who threatened 
Alexis Miranda with violence to himself and his family in order to 
collect loans of $1,000 and $2,000. The Court, speaking through 
Justice Douglas, noted that "[w]here the class of activities is regu-
lated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts 
have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the 
class. "35 After stating that " [ e ]xtortionate credit transactions, 
though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect 
interstate commerce,"36 the Court reviewed the statute's legislative 
history 
in detail to answer the impassioned plea of petitioner that all that is 
involved in loan sbarking is a traditionally local activity. It appears, 
instead, that loan sharking in its national setting is one way organized 
interstate crime holds its guns to the beads of the poor and the rich 
alike and syphons funds from numerous localities to finance its na-
tional operations.37 
Thus, Jones & Laughlin and such subsequent cases as Wickard and 
Perez appeared to have put an effective quietus on judicial attempts 
to second-guess the political branches on substantive policy choices 
made under the aegis of the commerce power. Until Lopez. 
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist's Lopez opinion praises his 
predecessor's Jones & Laughlin opinion as a "watershed," Chief 
Justice Hughes's spacious rhetoric finds little echo in Lopez. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist employs a rhetoric of caution in explaining the 
shortcomings of the Government's arguments and of the arguments 
deployed by Justice Breyer in the principal dissenting opinion:38 
The Government argues that possession of a firearm in a school zone 
may result in violent crime and that violent crime can be expected to 
affect the functioning of the national economy in two ways. First, the 
costs of violent crime are substantial, and, through the mechanism of 
insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population. Second, 
violent crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas 
within the country that are perceived to be unsafe. The Government 
35. Perez, 402 U.S. at 154 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968)). 
36. Perez, 402 U.S. at 154. 
37. 402 U.S. at 156-57. Justice Stewart dissented: 
[U]nder the statute before us a man can be convicted without any proof of interstate 
movement, of the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, or of facts showing that his 
conduct affected interstate commerce. I think the Framers of the Constitution never 
intended that the National Government might define as a crime and prosecute such 
wholly local activity through the enactment of federal criminal Jaws. 
402 U.S. at 157. 
38. Justice Breyer's opinion was joined by his three dissenting colleagues, Justices Ste-
vens, Souter, and Ginsburg. 
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also argues that the presence of guns in schools poses a substantial 
threat to the educational process by threatening the learning environ-
ment. A handicapped educational process, in tum, will result in a less 
productive citizenry. That, in tum, would have an adverse effect on 
the Nation's economic well-being. As a result, the Government ar-
gues that Congress could rationally have concluded that § 922( q) sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce . 
. . . Under the theories that the Government presents in support of 
§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, 
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where 
States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the 
Government's argument, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by 
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate. 
Justice BREYER focuses, for the most part, on the threat that 
firearm possession in and near schools poses to the educational pro-
cess and the potential economic consequences flowing from that 
threat. Specifically, the dissent reasons that (1) gun-related violence 
is a serious problem; (2) that problem, in tum, has an adverse effect 
on classroom learning; and (3) that adverse effect on classroom learn-
ing, in tum, represents a substantial threat to trade and commerce. 
This analysis would be equally applicable, if not more so, to subjects 
such as family law and direct regulation of education. 
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to 
pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to con-
vert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general 
police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of 
our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great 
deference to congressional action. The broad language in these opin-
ions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we de-
cline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to 
conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not pre-
suppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a 
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. This 
we are unwilling to do.39 
And the question arises, does Lopez portend a major retreat 
from Jones & Laughlin and a return to a judicially jaundiced view 
of congressional exercise of the commerce power? Or will Lopez 
- notwithstanding that three of the five Justices in the majority 
and three of the four Justices in the minority filed opinions that 
seemed to attest to the case's potential importance40 - be 
39. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632-34 (1995) (citations omitted). 
40. Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and Justice O'Connor, filed a concurring opinion; 
the concurrence expressly states, "I join in the opinion and judgment of the Court." 115 S. 
Ct. at 1642. Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion that in certain aspects - chiefly, 
its rejection of the proposition that Congress can regulate activities which have a "substantial 
effect" on commerce, its suggestion that for the Framers "the term 'commerce' was used in 
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remembered simply as a case in which a provision of minor conse-. 
quence, one that in effect merely would have replicated equivalent 
statutes already on the books in four-fifths of the states,41 was de-
leted from Title 18? The ambiguity of what the majority have 
wrought in Lopez is best put in the closing paragraph of Justice 
Souter's dissent: 
Because Justice BREYER's opinion demonstrates beyond any 
doubt that the Act in question passes the rationality review that the 
Court continues to espouse, today's decision may be seen as only a 
misstep, its reasoning and its suggestions not quite in gear with the 
prevailing standard, but hardly an epochal case. I would not argue 
otherwise, but I would raise a caveat. Not every epochal case has 
come in epochal trappings. Jones & Laughlin did not reject the di-
rect-indirect standard in so many words; it just said the relation of the 
regulated subject matter to commerce was direct enough. But we 
know what happened.42 
Ill. 
Are the trial and tribulations, and the ultimate deliverance, of 
Alfonso Lopez, Jr., likely to prove, in Justice Souter's word, "ep-
ochal"?43 Or merely anecdotal? To attempt an answer it may be 
useful to look behind the Court's rhetoric and to examine more 
closely the underlying litigation. In particular, it may be useful to 
consider how Lopez arose and then to consider the analytic path 
along which the Court's opinion marched from the underlying facts 
to the conclusion that Lopez's conviction was unconstitutional. 
In the academic year 1991-1992, Lopez was a senior at Edison 
High School in San Antonio, Texas. On March 10, he arrived at 
school carrying a concealed .38 caliber handgun and five bullets.44 
School staff had been alerted, anonymously, that Lopez was bring-
contradistinction to productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture," 115 S. Ct. at 
1643, and also its expressed hope that "[i]n a future case, we ought to temper our Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of our more recent case law and is 
more faithful to the original understanding of that Clause," 115 S. Ct. at 1642 - seems in 
tension with Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Justice Thomas states that he "join[s] the 
majority," 115 S. Ct. at 1642, but whether that statement signifies joining the opinion as well 
as the judgment is unclear. Justice Kennedy's concurrence, in apparent response to Justice 
Thomas, states that stare decisis "forecloses us from reverting to an understanding of com-
merce that would serve only an 18th-century economy." 115 S. Ct. at 1637. The principal 
dissent, by Justice Breyer, is joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Justices Ste-
vens and Souter each filed separate dissents. 
41. See supra note 16. 
42. 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (citations omitted). 
43. See 115 S. Ct. at 1657. 
44. According to Lopez, his role was that of courier: for $40, he agreed to carry the 
handgun from "Gilbert" to "Jason," who planned to use it in a "gang war." See United States 
v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), affd., 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
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ing a gun to school. Lopez was apprehended and charged with vio-
lating a Texas statute that bars gun possession on school premises. 
A day later, charges were filed against him under the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act.4S Upon the filing of the federal charges, the 
Texas authorities discontinued the state prosecution. 
Lopez moved to dismiss the federal charges, contending that 
section 922( q) of title 18 was "unconstitutional as it is beyond the 
power of Congress to legislate control over public schools."46 Dis-
trict Judge H.F. Garcia denied the motion, ruling that the statute 
was "a constitutional exercise of Congress' well-defined power to 
regulate activities in an[d] affecting commerce, and the 'business' of 
elementary, middle and high schools . . . affects interstate com-
merce."47 A bench trial on stipulated facts resulted in Lopez's con-
viction, followed by a sentence of six months in prison and two 
years of supervised release. 
On appeal, Lopez again pressed his constitutional challenge to 
section 922( q). The Fifth Circuit, speaking through Judge Gar-
wood, reversed.48 The court pointed out that the statute - which 
in terms sought to criminalize mere possession of a firearm in a 
school zone, without more - was different in kind from most other 
federal gun-control statutes: "With the exception of a few relatively 
recent, special case provisions, federal laws proscribing firearm pos-
session require the government to prove a connection to com-
merce."49 The court then went on to examine in considerable detail 
"the history of presently relevant firearms control legislation. "50 
Judge Garwood summarized the legislative history of section 
922( q) thus: 
The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, now section 922(q), was 
introduced in the Senate by Senator Herbert Kohl as S. 2070 and a 
virtually identical bill with the same title was introduced in the House 
by Representative Edward Feighan as H.R. 3757. The Senate version 
was eventually enacted as part of Title XVII of the Crime Control 
Act of 1990, P.L. 101-647 § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844-45. The House Re-
port accompanying the Crime Control Act broadly declares that the 
intent of the Crime Control Act was "to provide a legislative response 
to various aspects of the problem of crime in the United States." 
H.R.Rep. No. ~01-681(1), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1990), reprinted in 
45. For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994) as it stood when Lopez was arrested, see 
supra note 14. 
46. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345. 
47. 2 F.3d at 1345. 
48. See 2 F.3d at 1345. 
49. 2 F.3d at 1347. 
50. 2 F.3d at 1348. 
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1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6473. However, this report makes no men-
tion whatsoever of the impact upon commerce of firearms in schools. 
Nor does the report even mention the Gun-Free School Zones Act. 
Although S. 2070 has no formal legislative history that we know of, a 
House subcommittee hearing was held on H.R. 3757. Witnesses told 
this subcommittee of tragic instances of gun violence in our schools, 
but there was no testimony concerning the effect of such violence 
upon interstate commerce.sl 
Garwood also pointed out that the Chief of the Firearms Division 
of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) 
and the BATF's Deputy Chief Counsel testified to this deficiency in 
the bill: 
Finally, we would note that the source of constitutional authority 
to enact the legislation is not manifest on the face of the bill. By 
contrast, when Congress first enacted the prohibitions against posses-
sion of firearms by felons, mental incompetents and others, the legis-
lation contained specific findings relating to the Commerce Clause 
and other constitutional bases, and the unlawful acts specifically in-
cluded a commerce element.s2 
Garwood continued with his analysis: 
Although both the House and Senate sponsors of the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act made fairly lengthy floor statements about it, 
neither congressman had anything to say about commerce in their re-
marks. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17595 (1990) (statement. of Sen. Kohl); 
136 Cong. Rec. S766 (1990) (same); 135 Cong. Rec. E3988 (1989) (in-
serted statement of Rep. Feighan). 
The failure of section 922( q) to honor the traditional division of 
functions between the Federal Government and the States was com-
mented upon by President Bush when he signed the Crime Control 
Act of 1990: 
"I am also disturbed by provisions in S. 3266 that unnecessarily 
constrain the discretion of State and local governments. Examples 
are found in Title VIII's 'rural drug enforcement' program; in Title 
XV's 'drug-free school zones' program; and in Title XVIII's program 
for 'correctional options incentives.' Most egregiously, Section 1702 
[the section of the Crime Control Act embodying§ 922(q)] inappro-
priately overrides legitimate State firearms laws with a new and unnec-
essary Federal law. The policies reflected in these provisions could 
legitimately be adopted by the States, but they should not be imposed 
on the States by the Congress.''53 
The absence of any inkling that Congress perceived a link be-
tween gun possession in schools and interstate commerce was, for 
51. 2 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990: Hearings·on H.R. 3757 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 
(1990) (statements of Richard Cook and Bradley Buckles)). 
52. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1348. 
53. 2 F.3d at 1359-60. 
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the Fifth Circuit, decisive. The court recognized Congress's power 
to regulate 
a class of activities the individual instances of which have an interac-
tive effect, usually because of market or competitive forces, on each 
other and on interstate commerce. A given local transaction in credit, 
or use of wheat, because of national market forces, has an effect on 
the cost of credit or price of wheat nationwide .... We see no basis for 
assuming, particularly in the absence of supporting Congressional 
findings or legislative history, that, for example, ordinary citizen pos-
session of a shotgun during July 900 feet from the grounds of an out-
of-session private first grade in rural Llano County, Texas, has any 
effect on education even in relatively nearby Austin, much less in 
Houston or New Orleans .... [A]ny such holding would open virtu-
ally all aspects of education, public and private, elementary and other, 
to the reach of the Commerce Clause.54 
From this set of premises, the court moved to its conclusion: 
We hold that section 922( q), in the full reach of its terms, is invalid 
as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
Whether with adequate Congressional findings or legislative history, 
national legislation of similar scope could be sustained, we leave for 
another day. Here we merely hold that Congress has not done what is 
necessary to locate section 922( q) within the Commerce Clause. And, 
we expressly do not resolve the question whether section 922( q) can 
ever be constitutionally applied. Conceivably, a conviction under sec-
tion 922( q) might be sustained if the government alleged and proved 
that the offense had a nexus to commerce. Here, in fact, the parties 
stipulated that a BATF agent was prepared to testify that Lopez's gun 
had been manufactured outside of the State of Texas. Lopez's convic-
tion must still be reversed, however, because his indictment did not 
allege any connection to interstate commerce.55 
It is against this background that the Court granted certiorari, 
heard argument in the fall of 1994,56 and, five months later, an-
nounced its decision. The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court was 
joined by Justice Scalia without comment; it was joined by Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy with comment, in the form of an extended 
concurring opinion written by Justice Kennedy. Justice Thomas, 
while stating that he "join[ ed] the majority," wrote separately "to 
observe that our case law has drifted far from the original under-
standing of the Commerce Clause"57 and then distances himself 
54. 2 F.3d at 1367. 
55. 2 F.3d at 1367-68. 
56. The importance that the Government attached to the case is reflected in the fact that 
Solicitor General Days elected to present the Government's argument himself. Curiously, 
Law Week did not select the Lopez argument as one to be reported in its journalistic, as 
distinct from its formal, account of the Court's proceedings. See 63 U.S.L.W. 3409, 3419 
(U.S. Nov. 29, 1994). 
57. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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from certain aspects of the Chief Justice's opinion .. Without refer-
ring specifically to Justice Thomas's concurrence, Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence distances himself and Justice O'Connor from "revert-
ing to an understanding of commerce that would serve only an 
18th-century economy."58 The four dissenters- Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer- filed three opinions. The principal 
dissent - that of Justice Breyer - speaks for all four dissenters. 
Justice Stevens filed a brief separate dissent, and Justice Souter a 
longer one. 
To determine whether the Court's decision in Lopez was "ep-
ochal" or not, the opinion that warrants chief attention is that of the 
Chief Justice because it speaks for at least four - and in some re-
spects five - of the Justices. The Chief Justice's conclusions al-
ready have been set forth. What requires some scrutiny is the 
commerce power analysis that led to those conclusions. The Chief 
Justice very properly begins his analysis with Chief Justice Mar-
shall's magisterial opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden. 59 Mter canvassing 
the major cases from Gibbons v. Ogden through Jones & Laughlin, 
Wickard v. Filburn, and beyond, the Chief Justice undertakes to 
synthesize the governing case law, stating that 
we have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress 
may regulate under its commerce power .... First, Congress may reg-
ulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce .... Second, Con-
gress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, 
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities .... 
Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate 
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, 
... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.60 
58. 115 S. Ct. at 1637; see also supra note 40. 
59. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The concurring opinions of Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas also pay homage to Gibbons v. Ogden, as do the dissenting opinions of Justices 
Breyer and Souter, albeit more briefly. Justice Thomas notes that Justice Breyer reads Gib-
bons v. Ogden as having "established that Congress may control all local activities that 'sig-
nificantly affect interstate commerce; " Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1646, a reading that Justice 
Thomas regards as "wrong," see 115 S. Ct. at 1646. Justice Thomas's view that the Constitu-
tion does not confer on Congress the authority to regulate matters that "affect" commerce -
whether "significantly" or, as the Court's opinion has it, "substantially," see 115 S. Ct. at 1630 
- places his Commerce Clause jurisprudence in tension not only with the dissenters but also 
with his four colleagues in the majority. 
60. 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30. The Chief Justice's formulation appears to track closely Justice 
Douglas's formulation for the Court in Perez: 
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems. First, the use 
of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress deems are being misused, 
as, for example, the shipment of stolen goods (18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-2315) or of persons 
who have been kidnaped (18 U.S.C. § 1201). Second, protection of the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, as, for example, the destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 32), 
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Having identified the three "broad categories of activity that 
Congress may regulate under its commerce power," the Chief Jus-
tice then addresses 
the power of Congress, in the light of this framework, to enact 
§ 922(q). The first two categories of authority may be quickly dis-
posed of: § 922( q) is not a regulation of the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce; nor is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate 
transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce; 
nor can § 922( q) be justified as a regulation by which Congress has 
sought to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing 
in interstate commerce. Thus, if § 922( q) is to be sustained, it must be 
under the third category as a regulation of an activity that substan-
tially affects interstate commerce.61 
In considering whether section 922( q) can be sustained as "a 
regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate com-
merce," the Chief Justice's opinion pursues two alternative lines of 
authority, neither of which section 922( q) is thought to satisfy. 
Both lines of authority need to be addressed. 
"First," notes the opinion, "we have upheld a wide variety of 
congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we 
have concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate 
commerce."62 The opinion lists several examples - "intrastate 
coal mining,"63 "intrastate extortionate credit transactions,"64 "res-
taurants using substantial interstate supplies,"65 "inns and hotels ca-
tering to interstate guests,"66 and "consumption of home-grown 
wheat"67 - and then observes: 
Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of 
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved eco-
nomic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone 
does not .... Section 922( q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has 
nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, 
however broadly one might define those terms.6B 
or persons or things in commerce, as, for example, thefts from interstate shipments (18 
U.S.C. § 659). Third, those activities affecting commerce. 
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). 
The one significant difference between the Perez and Lopez formulations is that the Perez 
third category- "those activities affecting commerce"- is in Lopez "those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce." 
61. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. 
62. 115 S. Ct. at 1630. 
63. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264 {1981). 
64. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 146. 
65. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
66. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 {1964). 
67. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
68. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 (1995). The opinion goes on to state 
that "[s]ection 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in 
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The examples the opinion cites are, to be sure, instances in which 
the regulated activity substantially affecting commerce happens to 
be of a kind that can be characterized as "economic," but it is not 
clear why that descriptive fact should be turned into a limiting con-
stitutional principle. From a constitutional perspective, the impor-
tant question should be whether the activity sought to be regulated 
has a substantial effect on commerce - in other words, a substan-
tial "economic" effect - not whether the activity is itself "eco-
nomic." Indeed, that is what Justice Jackson apparently sought to 
convey in his opinion for the Court in Wickard, in a passage quoted 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez: "[E]ven if appellee's activity 
be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may 
still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a sub-
stantial economic effect on interstate commerce .... "69 
It would appear, then, that the relevant inquiry would not be 
whether gun possession is "economic" but whether it has substan-
tial economic consequences. That, in tum, makes pertinent the 
Chief Justice's further point that section 922( q) is not buttressed by 
legislative findings of a sort that "would enable us to evaluate the 
legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially af-
fected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect 
was visible to the naked eye."70 The Chief Justice acknowledges 
"that Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as 
to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate com-
merce."71 The point is simply that findings may clarify what other-
wise is obscure. The dissenters, for their part, were prepared to do 
the work that Congress did not do. The result was an opinion by 
Justice Breyer - fortified by a bibliographic appendix almost as 
long as the opinion - demonstrating the linkages between violence 
in schools, an impoverished educational process, an unskilled work 
force, and weak national productivity. The opinion is a tour de 
force. It shows, beyond question, "that Congress could reasonably 
have found the empirical connection that its law, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, asserts."n The difficulty is that Congress not only found 
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activities were regu-
lated." 115 S. Ct. at 1631. It is not clear whether this sentence is merely a reformulation of 
the preceding recital, quoted in the text, that§ 922(q) "has nothing to do with 'commerce' or 
any sort of economic enterprise." 115 S. Ct. at 1631. Conceivably, the sentence is not just a 
reformulation but an extension pursuant to which activity that is not "economic" can be 
regulated if the regulation is "part of a larger regulation of economic activity." 
69. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125, quoted in Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628. 
70. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. 
71. 115 S. Ct. at 1631. 
72. 115 S. Ct. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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nothing until 1994 - ex post insofar as Alfonso Lopez was con-
cerned - when it amended the statute to add findings,73 but Con-
gress gave no indication of ever having looked for anything. 
Having found that section 922(q) is not sufficiently "economic," 
the Chief Justice's opinion pursues an alternative analysis under 
which the statute is also found wanting: "Second, § 922( q) contains 
no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case 
inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate 
commerce."74 The opinion here discusses United States v. Bass,7S a 
case construing a statute making it a crime when one previously 
convicted of a felony "receives, possesses, or transports in com-
merce or affecting commerce"76 any firearm. In Bass, the felon-
defendant was found guilty of possession, and no showing was 
made that the possession was "in commerce or affecting com-
merce."77 The Court of Appeals reversed, concerned that the Gov-
ernment's contention - namely, that the statute required a 
commerce connection only as to a firearm that a felon "transports," 
not as to a firearm that a felon "receives" or "possesses" - would 
pose serious constitutional questions.78 The Supreme Court af-
firmed. Justice Marshall, writing for a five-Justice majority, parsed 
the text of the statute and reviewed its legislative history and found 
that "we are left with an ambiguous statute."79 With matters in that 
posture, the Court rejected the Government's construction of the 
statute for two reasons: first, because principles of lenity should 
govern in the construction of criminal statutes; and second, because 
principles of federalism counsel against reading a federal statute as 
trenching heavily upon matters of traditionally local concern unless 
Congress makes its purpose to do so abundantly clear. Justice Mar-
shall's opinion noted that, as a consequence of rejecting the Gov-
ernment's construction of the statute, "we do not reach the 
question whether, upon appropriate findings, Congress can consti-
tutionally punish the 'mere possession' of firearms. "80 
73. See supra note 14. 
74. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. 
75. 404 u.s. 336 (1971). 
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1968). 
77. See United States v. Bass, 308 F. Supp. 1385 (S.D.N.Y.), revd., 434 F.2d 1296 (2d Cir. 
1970), affd., 404 U.S. 336 (1971). 
78. United States v. Bass, 434 F.2d 1296, 1299-301 (2d Cir. 1970), affd., 404 U.S. 336 
(1971). 
79. Bass, 404 U.S. at 347. 
80. 404 U.S. at 339 n.4. Justices Blackmun and Burger were of the view that the statute 
was intended to "reach all possessions and receipts of firearms by convicted felons, and that 
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After summarizing the Court's decision in Bass, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's Lopez opinion observes that "[u]nlike the statute in 
Bass, § 922( q) has no express jurisdictional element which might 
limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that addition-
ally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate 
commerce. "81 
The Lopez opinion does not discuss how easy it is to add the 
necessary "jurisdictional element." No reference is made to Scar-
borough v. United States, 82 which followed Bass. In Scarborough, 
the Court again was called on to construe the felon-in-possession 
statute. This time, the question was whether the statute's "in com-
merce or affecting commerce" requirement - the so-called 
"nexus" to commerce - was satisfied by a showing that the fire-
. arms in question "had traveled in interstate commerce"83 prior to 
the defendant's felony conviction and, indeed, so far as appears, 
prior to the defendant's acquisition of the firearms. Justice Mar-
shall again wrote for the Court; this time, the conviction was sus-
tained. "Congress," wrote Justice Marshall, "sought to reach 
possessions broadly, with little concern for when the nexus with 
commerce occurred. "84 
Bass reserved "the question whether, upon appropriate findings, 
Congress can constitutionally punish the 'mere possession' of fire-
arms."ss Lopez may be thought to stand for the proposition that 
the answer to that question is "no." Or Lopez may be thought to 
hold that section 922( q) is invalid because Congress did not make 
"appropriate findings" - indeed, made none.s6 Whichever reading 
of Lopez one chooses, the escape route - the "nexus" - is there 
for the asking. The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court beckons in 
that direction. The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, while 
noting "the tendency of [section 922(q)] to displace state regulation 
the Court should move on and decide the constitutional issue present in this case." 404 U.S. 
at 356 {Biackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.). 
The Bass Court consisted of only seven Justices. Justices Powell and Rehnquist, nomi-
nated to succeed Justices Black and Harlan, had been confirmed and commissioned prior to 
the decision in Bass, but they did not take their seats until approximately three weeks after 
the decision. 
81. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995). 
82. 431 u.s. 563 {1977). 
83. 431 U.S. at 565. 
84. 431 U.S. at 577 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the 
decision. 
85. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 n.4 (1971). 
86. Taking it as common ground that Congress has no formal obligation to make findings, 
it would appear that in certain instances it has a prudential obligation to do so. See supra text 
accompanying note 28. 
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in areas of traditional state concern,"87 offers no basis for conclud-
ing that he and Justice O'Connor have reservations about the Chief 
Justice's "jurisdictional element" analysis. Apart from Justice 
Thomas, whose concurrence voices his doubts about the entire 
"substantially affects commerce" jurisprudence, there appears to be 
no member of the Court who would resist a legislative face-lift of 
section 922( q) that added a "nexus" requiring that firearms subject 
to the statute have traveled in commerce. The ease of establishing 
such a connection to commerce is illustrated by Lopez itself, for, as 
the Fifth Circuit noted, the parties stipulated that a BATF agent 
could testify to the out-of-state provenance of the gun that Alfonso 
Lopez brought to school.88 The commerce "nexus" may be seen as 
a "jurisdictional element" responsive to the scope and defined 
boundaries of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution. Or 
it may be seen as just a lawyer's gimmick. 
IV. 
In the foregoing pages, an attempt has been made - primarily 
by parsing the Court's opinion at length - to determine whether 
Lopez should be tagged with the sobriquet Justice Souter hopes it 
does not deserve: "epochal." It is the verdict of this writer that 
Lopez will not prove "epochal." Further, Lopez, taken as a whole, 
does not even fully satisfy Justice Stevens's characterization as 
"radical."89 Had the majority been guided by Justice Thomas's si-
ren song "to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a man-
ner that both makes sense of our recent case law and is more 
faithful to the original understanding of that Clause,"90 the adjec-
tives "radical" and "epochal" would have been examples of judicial 
restraint. For Justice Thomas apparently would jettison the "sub-
stantially affects" jurisprudence and at least cast a kindly eye on re-
constricting the word "commerce" to equate it with bringing goods 
to market as distinct from growing or manufacturing such goods. 
But Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court gives no com-
fort to such constitutional regression. And Justice Scalia, by his si-
lence, expresses contentment with the Chief Justice's exposition. 
And Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, is adamant that 
the Court "not ... call in question the essential principles now in 
'07. 115 S. Ct. at 1641. 
88. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
89. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651. 
90. 115 S. Ct. at 1642. 
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place"91 and, in particular, that the Court responsibly cannot con-
sider "reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve 
only an 18th-century economy."92 Justice Thomas appears to have 
no allies in his campaign to downsize the Commerce Clause. 
To be sure, there is one area in which, as Justice Breyer points 
out, the language in the Court's opinion may seem to unsettle set-
tled principles. "[T]he Court believes the Constitution would dis-
tinguish between two local activities, each of which has an identical 
effect on interstate commerce, if one, but not the other, is 'commer-. 
cial' in nature."93 Justice Breyer is right to be concerned. The sup-
posed distinction lacks adequate constitutional footing. For reasons 
noted earlier in this foreword,94 it would not appear that the distinc-
tion would survive analysis in a case that centrally posed the ques-
tion. Furthermore, it seems improbable that Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor see constitutional merit in the distinction, given their 
awareness of "the imprecision of content-based boundaries used 
without more to define the limits of the Commerce Clause."95 
This is not to say that Lopez is a decision without consequences. 
There will, at a minimum, be substantial transaction costs in the 
form of litigation fleshing out what Lopez means. Indeed, a flurry 
of litigation already is under way - and, not surprisingly, lower 
federal courts already have shown some signs of disagreement.96 It 
may tum out, in the fullness of time, that a few statutes other than 
section 922( q) will be found wanting by the Supreme Court. But, to 
the extent that happens, it seems fair to surmise that a number of 
91. 115 S. Ct. at 1637. 
92. 115 S. Ct. at 1637. 
93. 115 S. Ct. at 1663. 
94. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70. 
95. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637. 
96. Compare United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995) and United 
States v. Sage, No. 3:95cr108, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15798 (D. Conn. Oct. 3, 1995) (holding 
the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 constitutional) with United States v. Mussari, 894 F. 
Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995) and United States v. Parker, Cr. No. 95-352, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17193 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1995) (Act unconstitutional). Compare Cheffer v. Reno, 55 
F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrance Act of 1994 
constitutional) with United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (holding the 
Act unconstitutional) (pre-Lopez decision). See United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 
1995) (Judges Lewis and Garth hold that the federal carjacking act is unconstitutional; Judge 
Becker dissents.); see also Cargill v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 3313 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1995) 
(No. 95-73) (denying certiorari to Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 
1995)). Justice Thomas filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari: "This case 
questions whether the Army Corps of Engineers can, under the Clean Water Act, constitu-
tionally assert jurisdiction over private property based solely on the actual or potential pres-
ence of migratory birds that cross state lines .... In light of Lopez, I have serious doubts 
about the propriety of the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over petitioner's land in this case." 
64 U.S.L.W. at 3313-14. 
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such casualties will be attributable not to a restless activism on the 
part of the Justices but to irresponsibility on the part of a Congress 
that has failed to make out even a minimally plausible case for 
utilizing the commerce power to undergird a new regulatory 
scheme, especially one that deals with problems historically re-
garded as chiefly of state and local concern. As Justice Kennedy 
states in his concurring opinion, "it would be mistaken and mischie-
vous for the political branches to forget that their sworn obligation 
to preserve and protect the Constitution in maintaining the federal 
balance is their own in the first and primary instance. "97 
Certainly the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 presented it-
self as an inviting target for Justices who felt it appropriate to re-
mind Congress that even the commerce power has limits and that 
judicial scrutiny is not to be warded off by the simple process of 
passing a law and then relying on the Solicitor General to incant the 
word "commerce." The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was 
neither requested nor welcomed by those with responsibility for 
federal law enforcement. It was enacted, it seems reasonable to 
suppose, because most members of Congress have never met a 
crime-creating or sentence-enhancing bill that they didn't like. The 
Act, as President Bush said, was an enactment that "inappropri-
ately overrides legitimate State firearms laws with a new and unnec-
essary Federal law."98 Presumably President Bush would have 
vetoed the statute had Congress not arranged to wedge it into a 
comprehensive crime control package that the administration 
deemed of value. So, in lieu of the President, five of the Justices 
vetoed an "unnecessary" statute that for no demonstrated reason 
intruded substantially on areas of traditional and cherished local 
concern. Justice Breyer, as spokesperson for his dissenting col-
leagues, was heroic in defense of the statute, making the case that 
Congress had not bothered to articulate because Congress really 
did not care. But the significance of Justice Breyer's heroics lies in 
the skill with which his opinion makes the conceptual case for sus-
taining Congress's handiwork. By contrast, the fact that the statute 
was voted down by a majority of the Justices is of little conse-
quence. In any event, it appears likely that the statute will re-
emerge, in a shiny new 1995 or 1996 model, complete with a 
"nexus" - a requirement that the government establish that the 
firearm "has moved in or otherwise affects interstate or foreign 
97. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1639. 
98. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
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commerce" - that presumably will be its constitutional bumper-
guard when it comes to judgment.99 
v. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that there is less in Lopez 
than meets the eye. That assessment may prove erroneous. But, 
whatever view one takes of the case, there is one respect in which 
Lopez undeniably has earned the thanks of scholars and practition-
ers alike- namely, that it is the catalyst of this important sympo-
sium on federalism. The valuable essays that follow confirm Justice 
Kennedy's dictum that "federalism was the unique contribution of 
the Framers to political science and political theory."loo These es-
says also confirm that federalism is alive and well today. 
99. The bill that is expected to accomplish this purpose is S. 890, the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1995, introduced by Senator Kohl with bipartisan support. The current admin-
istration, while strongly endorsing the bill, has the good grace - or at least the prudence -
not to contend that the bill is a priority matter from the perspective of national law enforce-
ment. Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger testified that "[t]he Act will neither limit 
nor preempt state and local legislation forbidding firearms near schools, and the States will 
continue to play the primary role in this area of Jaw enforcement. S. 890 should properly be 
viewed in most instances as a 'backup' to the State systems." Guns in School: A Federal 
Role?: Hearings on S. 890 Before the Subcomm on Youth Violence of the Senate Judiciary 
Comm, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1995). Notwithstanding the testimony of the Assistant At-
torney General, himself an eminent constitutional scholar, legislation of this sort is likely to 
have some impact on state law enforcement practices: As noted in the text, see supra text 
accompanying note 45, in the case of Alfonso Lopez, state charges were filed first but gave 
way to federal charges. This sequence was mentioned, albeit not discussed, in Judge Gar-
wood's opinion for the Fifth Circuit. It was also mentioned, albeit not discussed, in the Chief 
Justice's opinion for the Supreme Court. It was not mentioned in either of the two concur-
ring opinions or any of the dissents in the Supreme Court. 
100. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638. 
